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Retail trade
«When sales are doing
badly here, they do well
somewhere else» 
Internationalisation of distribution becomes an important matter in
times like the present, characterised by a steep downfall of
domestic consumption together with fierce competition. Never
before was the sentence more true that says: «When sales are 
doing badly here, they do well somewhere else».
Some years ago, it was enough to have testimonial presence at half
a dozen culturally similar countries in the vicinity to show that a
retail concept could go international. Today, overdependence on the
market of origin is considered a stigma that, combined with local
adverse conditions such as a reduction in sales, puts credibility in
jeopardy.
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Compared with manufacturing companies,
those in distribution are particularly complex
and face a hard task on their way to internation-
alisation. Dawson & Mukoyama (2003) identi-
fied some causes proving this assertion. For
instance, retailers have their assets scattered,
especially if their geographic spread is big,
whereas industrial companies have maximum
efficiency when concentrating them. This obliges
to pay more attention to spatial and cross-bor-
der coordination of systems, which are tighter 
as distribution companies go international.
Another difference highlighted by these authors
are the involvements of unequal cost structure
when expanding abroad, especially complica-
tions due to operating with different currencies.
More essentially, transnational activity demands
sensibility towards and adaptation to the local
culture that is not highlighted as strongly when






Setting up and managing distribution channels
is indispensable in competition between retail-
ers. This competition has extended its scope
from the local to the international and more
recently the global level.
Attention paid by academic literature to inter-
nationalisation of retailing produced its first
systematic pieces of work in the 1950s. They
were descriptive studies of the big US compa-
nies as they were expanding around the world
(e.g. Sears & Roebuck in Cuba in the 1940s).
During the 1970s and 1980s, and still within
this descriptive emphasis on the characteristics
of formats, innovative detailed literature and its
struggle in conquering foreign markets pro-
duced pieces of work focusing on the distinc-
tion between local, international and global
trade and its implications on standardisation or
adaptation to new target markets (e.g. Salmon
& Tjordman, 1989).
Transnational activity demands
sensibility towards and adaptation 
to the local culture that is not
highlighted as strongly when talking 
of activities of industrial and service
companies.
In the 1980s, the world’s biggest retail formats
were the object of study. A brief overview over
these firms shows that they are essentially US
companies that based their sales on high-
turnover consumer products (HTCP) or at least
depended on such sales together with others.
This research highlighted cross-border domina-
tion of the supply chain. Wal-Mart, Target and
Kroger were some examples focused on in
those years.
Towards the 1990s, the focus of academic litera-
ture moved to management and the scope of
retail activity in the globalisation process, its
causes and effects.
Today, the academic interest has moved into the
same direction as that of the consumer, and 
the focus on supermarkets and their logistic
systems has been replaced by the study of
global distributor brands like consolidated
H&M, DIA, Inditex, Amazon, IKEA and Mango
or those that have started this process at a firm
pace, like Sand, Intimissimi, Next and Uniqlo,
among which there are many from Catalonia:
Tous, Rosa Clarà, Desigual, Custo, Pronovias,
GAES, Punt Roma, Castañer and Sita Murt, to
name some. They are smaller in size than the
supermarket chains studied in the 1980s and
more heterogeneous as to their country of ori-
gin, but they have clear and very differentiated
concepts, powerful brands and a footprint in
dozens of countries.
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The evolution of the industries, the reasons, the
decisions of giving priority to any given coun-
tries and the role played by the different access
modes and formats in the expansion process
will be the main focus in this century.
The Catalan company Mango is among
the already consolidated global
distribution brands.
As to geographic variety, graph 1 shows that
the future of retail belongs to other regions
than today, not based on the current size but
on their potential growth. This graph shows 
the importance of retailing in the big emerging
powers in the future as opposed to apathy in
mature industrialised markets. It also shows 
the more modest but also more accessible
opportunity of small emerging markets, particu-
larly the closest ones.
The decreasing function as the GDP (Gross
Domestic Product) develops is determined by
two ratios. In the ordinate, it is annual con-
sumption growth measured between 2006 and
2010 (estimate), while the abscissa shows a sec-
ond ratio, GDP per capita. This function shows
the scarce growth margin promised by advanced
economies. Spain belongs to the least attractive
cluster, combining low growth with medium
GDP per capita.
This graph does not break down the consump-
tion growth variable in the ordinate. Behind
low growth of Spanish consumption (as can be
seen, not much worse that that of the EU-15)
lies a high unemployment rate, considerable
family debt, stocks resulting from fifteen years
of uninterrupted consumption growth – in the
form of newer durable goods (apparel, furni-
ture, personal information devices and cars) –
and a return to savings rates unheard in the last
two decades. Spaniards behave increasingly like
Northern Europeans, but with less available
income.






















































Graph 2. GDP per capita (2008) and growth
of consumer expenditure
Source: The Goldman Sachs Group, INC (Nov. 2009). «Europe: Retail».
Spaniards behave like Northern Europeans, but
with less available income.
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Graph 1. Growth of the share in global
expenditure
Source: The Goldman Sachs Group, INC (Nov. 2009). «Europe: Retail».
The graph shows that the future of retail
belongs to other regions than today.
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Graph 2 shows the share of the big emerging
countries in consumption growth, which can
impose some increasingly far, complex and
risky expansion demands on Spanish retailers.
It is no surprise that some most striking distri-
bution formulas in this decade have come from
retailers having entered markets with a high
country risk (Inditex with Stockman to enter
the Baltic states and Russia) or even an enor-
mous one (Inditex with Tata to serve the Indian
market from 2011).
Opportunities
Another variable to which literature on retailing
pays attention says that solid presence in the
domestic market is an indispensable require-
ment for successful international expansion,
which is justified by two reasons (Alexander &
Quinn, 2002). Firstly, «it contributes to learning
and developing management skills» and sec-
ondly, «it creates a membership network for
potential candidates».
Solid presence in the domestic




Of course, there are exceptions: Desigual car-
ried out its international expansion together
with local one, supporting one another, espe-
cially in its wholesale trade.
Consulted studies (e.g. Kacker, 1985) classify
causes for expansion in two big motivation
groups: push and pull. When a retailer finds a
small domestic market or one going through
deep recession in consumption or subject to
tight regulatory pressure, they can feel pushed
to expansion. Ahold to South America and
Jerónimo Martins to Eastern Europe are exam-
ples of HTCP retailers pushed outside their
country due to the size of their markets of ori-
gin (Netherlands and Portugal respectively).
However, when Carrefour opened its first
hypermarket in Catalonia, Pryca in El Prat out-
side Barcelona, it was our country as a market
what pulled them over.
The attractiveness of a country based on its pull
effect is determined by its size, current or
potential income of its residents and cultural
proximity to the country of origin. Low salary
costs, an attractive real estate branch and
absence of competition were the main causes of
the internationalisation of Carrefour. There is
no doubt that for most European retailers,
especially Spanish ones, push factors will domi-
nate over pull ones in 2010.
A second concept in studying internationalisa-
tion opportunities is graduality. As early as in
1977, Johanson & Vahlne stated that retailers
follow an expansion pattern by which expertise
and know-how add on with each entry into
new markets requiring increasingly complex
formats and being culturally or geographically
more distant from the country of origin.
Thus, Spanish companies go to neighbouring
markets like Portugal (GAES and Tous) or
France (Inditex) first. Central and South Amer-
ica is then usually the next step in internation-
alisation (GAES), which has the burden of
distance but the advantage of cultural proxim-
ity. There is a very positive image of Spanish
brands in Latin America, which explains why
Mexico was the first market on the way towards
internationalisation at Tous (being currently
their second biggest market), Massimo Dutti
and Inditex within twenty years and more
recently at Punt Roma, or that Argentina is so
for GAES. The second biggest market for DIA 
is France, and 25 years after opining their first
shops in Barcelona, Brazil will become the
third.
Confirmation of this graduality and the risk of
ignoring it becomes apparent in an overview of
recent expansion of five Spanish retailers shar-
ing their international ambition but with a dif-
ference in age (Mango, Zara, Tous, GAES and
Desigual) and branch.
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Zara, for instance, opened 137 shops in 2006, of
which only 20% were domestic openings. In
2008 they opened 159, of which only 14% in
Spain. In 2009, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
UAE, Thailand, Lebanon, Serbia and Russia
were the main destination countries of this
expansion (as well as other less exotic ones like
Italy and Belgium). Shop closures in that year
concentrated on Spain, France and Greece,
some of its oldest markets.
Mango opened in its turn 134 new shops in
2008 (205 in Spain). The UAE, Estonia, Norway,
Azerbaijan, Romania, Portugal, Iran and Iraq
were their destinations. Only 8% were local
openings in 2009, the remaining 92% being
spread over Belarus, Georgia, Iraq, New Cale-
donia, Kazakhstan, Korea, Turkey, China, the
Philippines and Japan.
Tous opened only 16% of its new shops in
Spain in 2009, but openings abroad are still
mostly in geographically or culturally close des-
tinations. America was among its most active
markets in 2009.
GAES is still developing the Spanish market as
a priority, with 75% of its openings in 2009.
DIA opened more than half of its shops in
Spain in 2006 but less than 20% in 2009.
Desigual went from opening 71% of its shops
in Spain in 2007 to 13% in 2009. 2008 was
divided equally between the local and the for-
eign market, showing a retailer with an aggres-
sive expansion but still with some potential in
its domestic market, thus deviating from gradu-
ality as suggested by Johanson & Vahlne.
Managing competencies
Apart from the impact of the skills of managers
in distribution companies, their causes have
also been explored by academic literature. What
is more beneficial, having managers with inter-
national experience to ensure success or the
effects of this experience on the skills of the
management in its fulfilment, no matter the
geographic scope of the market? Are these
competencies of managing teams the cause or
the effect of internationalisation?
The most internationalised European
retailers are those focusing on high-
turnover consumer goods (HTCP).
Authors conclude that it is much more impor-
tant to have a management able to tackle inter-
nationalisation beforehand than management
of internationalised companies being more
competent, and that the only benefit increasing
in the course of expansion is the relatively pow-
erful position vis-à-vis the suppliers, which is
higher than that of companies focusing on the
local market only.
Without determination, competence and tangi-
ble commitment of the management there is no
way forward. The biggest distraction is a munif-
icent local market. The most internationalised
European retailers are those focusing on high-
turnover consumer goods (HTCP). Operators
like Carrefour, Metro, Ahold, Tesco and Auchan
are clear examples. There is no Spanish retailer
in this group of internationalised pioneers,
although DIA, a discounter belonging to the
Carrefour group, has its headquarters, its whole
management and most of its 4000 discount
shops in Spain, from where it operates in fif-
teen countries in America, Europe and Asia.
A study by Myers & Alexander (1996) justifies
the contribution of manager ambition to this
process as it looks into the different attitudes
of executive managers at fifty of the then
biggest HTCP retailers from France, Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United
Kingdom. This study stated that in 1995,
French retailers were convinced of the interna-
tionalisation opportunities of their business.
Germans were as well, but only in neighbour-
ing markets (Austria or Belgium) they could
serve from Germany. The British and Dutch
had limited confidence, while Italians and
Spaniards had not international expansion
among their priorities.
51paradigmes /  Issue no. 4 / June 2010
A_07_Nueno_46-55.qxp:N4  28/6/10  16:32  Página 51
At that time, Spanish and Italian managers
were rather concentrating on the opportunities
in domestic markets. The French were the most
determined. So it can be concluded that deter-
mination of managers and their commitment in
tackling ambitious challenges were rather the
cause than the effect of internationalisation.
Without talent at their service, it would be bet-
ter to stay at home and languish.
Entering the same markets as all
competitors is a risk factor.
The main problems with international expan-
sion are related with haste. The first is «sheep
herd» behaviour in selecting markets, entering the
same as all competitors. This occurred with 
the textile branch in the Greek market in the
last three years – a country very attractive a pri-
ori for Spanish retailing but that turned out to
be so culturally close to the domestic market
that it has exactly the same problems. The sec-
ond problem is haste in choosing the access
mode besides the country, and underestimation
of its risk premium.
A well-known case is Ahold and problems
arisen from their entry within just 16 months,
between 1997 and 1998, to Brazil, Argentina,
Chile, Peru, Paraguay and Ecuador (a couple of
years before, Ahold pulled out of a project to
enter Spain in partnership with Caprabo and
later, almost in this century, its big independent
project in Spain with Supersol).
Underestimating integration difficulties, the
need of raising debt or not paying enough
attention to the quality of acquisitions in case
this is the pattern chosen to enter a market,
causes massive value destruction leading a
company to bankruptcy.
Access modes
Distributors with an international view have
several ways to enter a market: export (through
wholesaling, licensing or concessions),
franchising, acquisition of domestic operators,
mergers and direct introduction or organic
development. 
Examples of Spanish companies within each
mode are the following: wholesaling (Castañer in
Italy), organic development (Tous in the US and
UK), franchising (Mango and GAES) or conces-
sions, merger with a local retailer (Sephora and El
Corte Inglés) or acquisition, or partnerships (Indi-
tex with Tata in India, with Stockman in Finland
to enter the Baltic states and later Russia and
with Percassi in Italy, or Nespresso with the Dau-
rella family to enter the Catalan market).
Export, the first step in the internationalisation
process of a brand, is beyond the scope of this
article. It is about developing a strong interna-
tional brand and enter markets through what
Treadgold (1988) calls «low control» mecha-
nisms like wholesale to local distributors,
licensing or opening corners and concessions
at other retailers. This is the model of Nike,
Nokia and Punto Blanco, with occasional verti-
calisation of their distribution.
Global franchises are one of the most popular
schemes for international expansion.
Master/area, joint venture, direct and indirect
investment are the four franchise modes.
When indicating the reasons for which compa-
nies adopt these patterns, Alexander & Quinn
(2002) state first that «most work required to
expand operations in the foreign market is
born by the franchisee, which reduces that of
the franchiser».
Another reason they add «is local contribution
as it understands the market better than their
principal and is in a better position to handle
cultural, language and bureaucratic issues».
A third reason often used by Spanish compa-
nies is dampening the country risk and having
leverage resources and the franchisee’s com-
mitment. However, reduced perfection or
absence of follow-up and monitoring systems
has led to conflict, mistrust and reorienting this
pattern among Spanish operators.
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There are two access modes: the online and the
multiple channel.
The online channel is an excellent mechanism
for internationalisation. Examples of global
retailers with a growing market share in Spain
are Amazon.com and Vente-privee.com. Privalia
is an example of a Catalan company with a
strong, fast-growing footprint in the rest of
Spain. Their managers assert that turnover was
at around 60 million euros in 2009, and in
March 2010 they announced the opening of
their second international portal in Mexico.
A new academic opinion developed during 
the 1990s (Buchanan, 1992; Nueno & Quelch,
1998) that began to be implemented and stated
the superiority of the vertical distribution model
pioneered by manufacturers of renowned
brands, recovering control over their channels
as they withdrew distribution from franchisees,
concessionaires and multibrand retailers and
opened their own shops, taking the sole
responsibility over their expansion and interna-
tionalisation. This was a successful strategy and
is perhaps the reason why it was imposed, per-
haps by imitation, on modes combining direct
and indirect channels. However, progressive
expansion becoming less close and more com-
plex and more recently global recession in
 consumption, increasing real estate and com-
munication costs and the size of the big global
markets have sometimes meant that the feasi-
bility of international expansion turned out to
be impossible without a strategy encompassing
indirect wholesale trade (through department
stores and specialist shops) and with direct sale
through controlled (virtual or physical) chan-
nels. This is the multiple channel thesis and the
most frequently adopted pattern by Spanish
companies, combining wholesale trade at
department stores or independent retailers
with opening standard shops and franchises
run by operators. Mango has areas under con-
cession in Falabella shops in Chile and shops in
malls and own shops in the United States. Tous
uses the same scheme in Chile and the US
(Macy’s) with areas under concession in depart-
ment stores and own shops or in partnership
with local partners. Adolfo Domínguez has cor-
ners in Palacio del Hierro in Mexico City, and
Castañer sells through Colette, multibrand
shops, Galeries Lafayette and three own shops,
all of which in Paris.
Adding an online channel to an
existing distribution system is a
double-edge sword as it destroys
value in 30% of cases.
One of the first strategies to add to a consoli-
dated distribution system is the online channel
(under brand control), which can become a
double-edge sword. A study by Geyskens, 
Gielens & Dekimpe (2002) shows that adding
an online channel to an existing distribution
channel destroys value in 30% of cases (the
distributor’s share value drops).
Some recent PhD thesis tackles this challenge,
although related to adding sales points with
brand products from past seasons or with
defaults (outlets) to the existing consolidated
system. Results are not conclusive, basically
due to the current market situation. Tous, for
instance, has an online shop serving exclu-
sively the US market and relaunched in 2010
to supply more markets. Other national opera-
tors come back on outlets as a core scheme
(such as Ralph Lauren in Spain) ore just
another channel (Desigual, Mango), while
some use more aggressive methods (Lefties
from the Inditex group has an urban outlet
with a chain and brand of its own and just
moved its headquarters from León to Tordera
in Catalonia).
Conclusions
Catalan companies have been late in their
international expansion and often turned out 
to be overdependent on the domestic market.
In the absence of any causes to push them
abroad, their focus on a munificent and
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empathic market and maturity of close markets
has reduced their motivation to open to the world.
During the last two decades, both manufactur-
ers and distributors in industrialised countries
were more successful in exporting through
internationalisation of their shops than through
the products sold. Spain, and particularly Cat-
alonia have produced many success stories that
share the following factors, among others:
– They are centralised and do not fully domi-
nate local procurement, which keeps them out
of certain areas (e.g. HTCP) and restricts
expansion to rigid concepts and patterns hardly
adaptable to local specificities.
– They hardly adapt to consumer tastes in the
host country.
– They followed a pattern based on opening
few shops in many countries (sprinkler) rather
than penetrating less markets («oil drop»
expansion).
Current opportunities for them are complex by
scale and affinity:
– Polarised, emerging and small markets, like
the twelve latest accession countries, the total
size of which (e.g. textile) hardly doubles that
of the Spanish market, which amounted to 17
billion euros in 2009, or too large (BRIC), frag-
mented or culturally far attractive markets for
the future.
– Liabilities largely surpass short-term return
and require carefulness in the absence of local
partners or capital suppliers.
The most common recommendation by aca-
demic literature, adapting practices and
processes according to the cultural character of
the host country (Dawson, 1994), has been by
and large ignored by Spanish domestic champi-
ons, concentrated and based on as well as being
a hostage of very differentiated product con-
cepts. Inditex features an extremely centralised
model and Tous, GAES, Pronovias, Rosa Clarà
and Punt Roma have neither local subsidiaries
nor often specific country managers (GAES
being an exception there). Some of their man-
agers assert that this adaptability and empathy
requirement can be catered for from the head-
quarters. When taking decisions between cen-
tralising and relinquishing sales beyond the
target segment on the one hand and the risk of
diluting a multilocal success model on the other,
adapting it to each of the dozens of markets
they operate in, they prefer the former.
Relatively late access of Spanish distributors
means that the geographically or culturally clos-
est markets feature either places with deep root-
ing or other multinational or global retailers
having entered them many years ago. This
exposes latecomers to the complexity of emerging
markets. Retailers wishing to enter there need to
do the double task of developing a consumption
pattern while seizing market quota, which means
bigger obligations in terms of time and invest-
ment. They are thus required to adjust the ambi-
tion to the size of upcoming challenges. To
Starbucks, developing a market in Spain ensuring
turnover and business at all times of operation is
a requirement forcing to seize a share able to live
up to strong investment done so far. For a
medium-sized distributor, markets demanding
big efforts in passing the message can be difficult
to tackle. This warning is particularly relevant for
manufacturing companies in a verticalisation
process that tend to think that industrial rules
(scale vs. adaptability) are still valid in their
expansion as distributors.
Potential expansion markets are
becoming ever less attractive, farther,
more complex and risky.
«When sales are doing badly here, they do well
somewhere else», but the effects of good per-
formance in the latter markets are visible in
those having entered them by attraction rather
than by force. Talent and commitment of man-
agers able to tackle this challenge is neither
improvised nor bought, even less with increasing
demand, and potential expansion markets are
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becoming ever less attractive, farther, more
complex and risky. Internationalisation of dis-
tributors is a double-edge sword: there is nothing
making a model more credible to public opinion,
particularly financial institutions. Likewise,
there is nothing like failing in this challenge to
turn this credibility into mistrust and put the
model in jeopardy.
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